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Abstract
In another paper with the same name[1], we proposed a new representation of
Game Theory, but most results are given by specific examples and argument. In
this paper, we try to prove the conclusions as far as we can, including a proof of
equivalence between the new representation and the traditional Game Theory, and
a proof of Classical Nash Theorem in the new representation. And it also gives ma-
nipulation definition of quantum game and a proof of the equivalence between this
definition and the general abstract representation. A Quantum Nash Proposition is
proposed but without a general proof. Then, some comparison between Nash Equi-
librium (NE) and the pseudo-dynamical equilibrium (PDE) is discussed. At last,
we investigate the possibility that whether such representation leads to truly Quan-
tum Game, and whether such a new representation is helpful to Classical Game, as
an answer to the questions in [2]. Some discussion on continuous-strategy games
are also included.
Key Words: Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Quantum Game, Continuous Strat-
egy.
Pacs: 02.50.Le, 03.67.Lx
1 Introduction
In [1], we have pointed out that all ideas and concepts in traditional framework of
Game Theory can be translated into our new representation, by some specific examples
of discrete-strategy games. Now by giving some proof, especially a proof of Nash
Theorem, we wish to confirm that this new representation can express every idea in
traditional framework of classical game.
On the other hand, for quantum games, as pointed out in [2], two questions should
be answered when a quantum framework or a quantized version of classical game is
discussed to compare with the corresponding classical game. The first one is whether
the new approach is helpful to solve the classical one, the real original classical game,
not the quantized version. The second one is whether the quantized version is a truly
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quantum mechanics problem with independent meaning other than the corresponding
classical one. In this paper, we try to give a positive answer to those two questions,
although frankly speaking, our new representation of game theory[1] is not exactly the
same with quantum games in [3, 4].
In the next section (§2), we shortly review the structure of our new representation
and results when applied onto discrete-strategy game. Then classical Nash Theorem in
the new representation is proved in section §4 and compared with our Pseudo-dynamical
Equilibrium (PDE)(§5). In §6, Quantum Game is defined from the manipulation level
starting from quantum object and quantum operators. Also NE and Nash Theorem
for quantum game is proposed there, but not proved. The last part (§7) is devoted
to answer the two questions mentioned above, while a short summary of the results in
this paper is also included.
2 The new representation of classical game
Traditionally, a classical static non-cooperative game is defined as
Γc =
(
N∏
i=1
⊗Si,
{
Gi
})
, (1)
in which Si is the Li-element strategy set of player i, and G
i is a mapping from
∏N
i=1⊗Si
to R. A state of player i can be a mixture strategy as
~P i =
(
p11, · · · , p
1
µ, · · · , p
1
Li
)T
, (2)
in which piµ is the probability that player i choose strategy µ from the set Si. The
payoff value of player i is
Ei
(
~P 1, · · · , ~PN
)
=
∑
s1µ,···,s
N
ν
Gis1µ···sNν
p1µ · · · p
N
ν . (3)
So for state vector ~P i,
{
Gi
}
is a set of (0, N)-tensor. A Nash Equilibrium state
~P 1eq, · · · , ~P
N
eq is defined that
Ei
(
~P 1eq, · · · ,
~P ieq, · · · ,
~PNeq
)
≥ Ei
(
~P 1eq, · · · ,
~P i, · · · , ~PNeq
)
,∀i,∀~P i. (4)
For a continuous-strategy game, ~P i, the state vector of player i, will be a probability
distribution function on the continuous strategy set, and all summations turn into
integral.
In our new representation, we defined base vector and inner product in strategy
sets so as to form them as Hilbert space, and then the system state space is the direct
product space of all single-player spaces. The base vectors of player i’s strategy space
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are chosen as all the pure strategies, and denoted as
∣∣siµ〉, the inner product is defined
as 〈
siµ
∣∣siν〉 = δµν. (5)
So base vectors of system state space are
|S〉 =
∣∣s1µ〉 · · · ∣∣sNν 〉 , ∣∣s1µ, · · · , sNν 〉 . (6)
Then, a state of player i expressed in density matrix form is
ρi =
∑
µ
piµ |µ〉 〈µ| . (7)
So a system state is
ρS ,
N∏
i
ρi =
∑
S
p1µ · · · p
N
ν |S〉 〈S| . (8)
According to Quantum Mechanics, the expectation value should be calculated by E =
Tr
(
ρSH
)
, in which H is a quantum operator defined on system state space. We want
to keep the same mathematical form, so the payoff value of player i must be
Ei = Tr
(
ρSH i
)
. (9)
Now we need to define a payoff matrix H i to guarantee that the payoff from equ(9) are
equivalent with the payoff from equ(3). Under such requirement, we find
H i
SS
′ = GiSδSS′ or H
i =
∑
SS
′ GiSδSS′
∣∣∣S 〉〈S′∣∣∣ , (10)
in which
GiS = G
i
s1µ···s
N
ν
. (11)
It’s easy to check the equivalence,
Ei = Tr
(
ρSH i
)
=
∑
S
′
〈
S
′
∣∣ρSH i∣∣S′〉
=
∑
S
′
,S
〈
S
′
∣∣ρS |S 〉〈S|H i∣∣S′〉
=
∑
S
〈
S
∣∣ρS∣∣S〉H iSS
=
∑
S ρ
S
SSH
i
SS
=
∑
S p
1
µ · · · p
N
ν G
i
s1µ···s
N
ν
. (12)
Now in our new representation, a game is redefined as
Γc,new =
(
N∏
i=1
⊗Si,
{
H i
})
. (13)
So we have
Theorem I Classical game Γc,new is equivalent with game Γc.
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NE is redefined as ρSeq that
Ei
(
ρ1eq · · · ρ
i
eq · · · ρ
N
eq
)
≥ Ei
(
ρ1eq · · · ρ
i · · · ρNeq
)
,∀i,∀ρi. (14)
A reduced payoff matrix, which means the payoff matrix when all other players’ states
are fixed, is defined as
H iR = Tr−i
(
ρ1 · · · ρi−1ρi+1 · · · ρNH i
)
, (15)
in which Tr−i (·) means to do the trace in the space except the one of player i. If a
trace in player i’s space is needed, we denote it as Tri (·). Payoff value can also be
calculated by the reduced matrix as
Ei = Tri
(
ρiH iR
)
. (16)
3 Continuous strategy space
For a continuous-strategy game, we need to replace summation (
∑
µ) with integral
(
∫
dµ) and to replace probability piµ with probability density function p
i (µ). And
then, the inner product will be 〈
µi
∣∣νi〉 = δ (µi − νi) . (17)
In fact, before we define this, we have to claim what’s dµ, the measure of µ. But here,
let’s say our continuous strategies are something like price, so that a nature measure is
predefined. Another problem is the normalization condition. As Quantum Mechanics,
we have to deal with the term like 〈µ |µ〉 . In Quantum Mechanics, it doesn’t matter
if wave function is used as a description of state. On the other hand, from equ(12),
we know that because H i has only diagonal terms, only diagonal part of ρi will effect
the payoff. This means that if another density matrix but with the same diagonal part
is used to describe state, it will give the same payoff value. In Quantum Mechanics
viewpoint, a pure state described by a wave function can be used to replace the density
matrix of mixture state if
ρiss = φ
∗(s)φ(s). (18)
Then, in a continuous-strategy game, a state of player i is |φ〉 =
∫
dµφ(µ) |µ〉, or density
matrix form,
ρi =
∫ ∫
dµdνφ∗(ν)φ(µ) |µ〉 〈ν| . (19)
But only diagonal term φ∗(µ)φ(µ) will effect the payoff. The normalization condition∫
dµ
〈
µ
∣∣ρi∣∣µ〉 = 1 gives ∫
dµφ∗(µ)φ(µ) = 1. (20)
The traditional payoff function and the relation with payoff value is
Ei =
∫
dSp1
(
s1
)
· · · pN
(
sN
)
Gi
(
s1, · · · , sN
)
, (21)
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in which, according to eu(18), pi(µ) =
∣∣φi (µ)∣∣2. And in our new representation,
Ei =
∫
dS 〈S| ρ1 · · · ρNH i |S〉 , (22)
in which
H i =
∫ ∫
dSdS
′
∣∣∣S 〉〈S′∣∣∣Gi (S) δ(S − S′). (23)
It’s easy to prove equ(21) and equ(22) give the same payoff value. Although here all
formulas are derived in continuous strategy space form, for discrete strategy games,
pure state with condition
∣∣φiµ∣∣2 = piµ can also be used to replace density matrix form
of mixture state and give the same payoff.
4 Proof of Nash Theorem
Nash Theorem proves the existence of NE. For a game defined by equ(1), equilibrium
states defined by equ(4) always exist. Now in our new representation, Nash Theorem
is reexpressed as
Theorem II For a game defined by equ(13), equilibrium states defined by equ(14)
always exist.
Proof Just following the idea of Nash’s proof, first, we define a mapping, and prove
the existence of the fixed points of this mapping. Then we will prove the fixed points
are NE.
A mapping is defined as(
ρ1,
′
, · · · , ρN,
′
)
= T
(
ρ1, · · · , ρN
)
, (24)
in which,
ρi,
′
=
ρi
1 + Tr (∆Ei)
+
∆Ei
1 + Tr (∆Ei)
, (25)
in which
∆Ei =Max
{
0,H iR − E
i
(
ρS
)
Ii
}
, (26)
in which Max means to get the bigger one between every element. First, as a physicist
usually does, let’s show the fixed points are NE. Denote the fixed points as ρSeq =∏N
i=1 ρ
i
eq, then
ρieqTr
(
∆Ei
)
= ∆Ei. (27)
It’s easy to know that
∆Ei = 0 (28)
is one of the solutions. Let’s suppose ∆Ei 6= 0, because every element is bigger than 0,
Tr
(
∆Ei
)
> 0. Therefor, from equ(27), if the diagonal element of ρieq,µµ > 0, ∆E
i
µµ > 0.
Then from equ(26), the definition of ∆Ei, because it’s bigger than zero,
H iR,µµ > E
i
(
ρS
)
=
∑
ν
ρieq,ννH
i
R,νν ,∀ρ
i
eq,µµ > 0.
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So the weighted average of H iR,µµ,∑
µ
ρieq,µµH
i
R,µµ >
∑
ν
ρieq,ννH
i
R,νν
That’s impossible. So ∆Ei = 0 is the only solution. Therefor, from equ(26),
Ei
(
ρSeq
)
≥ H iR,µµ,∀µ.
And then, since it’s bigger than every element of H iR, it’s bigger than any weighted
average of them, so it’s NE. All players can’t get more payoff by adjusting their own
states independently. Now we claim that this is a continuous and onto mapping from
system Hilbert space to itself. So it has fixed points. This detailed proof is neglected
here.
Now we have shown that the existence of Nash Equilibrium in our new represen-
tation. The mapping defined here can be regarded as an iteration starting from any
arbitrary initial system state. But does it converge onto the fixed points? Are the fixed
points stable? From NE and the proof of Nash Theorem, no thing we can say about
this question. The real experience in application of Game Theory shows that sometime
the NE is not stable. If they are unstable, they are not very meaningful to be regarded
as a prediction of the game.
However, our representation here is quite similar with Quantum Mechanics and
Statistical Mechanics. We have state vector or density matrix, and we have dynamical
variables such as payoff matrix and reduced payoff matrix, which look very like a
Hamiltonian. The only thing missing here is a dynamical equation, which determines
the evolution of state.
5 Comparison between NE and PDE
In order to give an evolutionary equation, we recall Master Equation for probability
distribution function,
dpi (x, t)
dt
=
∑
x
′
w
(
x
′
→ x
)
pi
(
x
′
, t
)
−
∑
x
′
w
(
x→ x
′
)
pi (x, t) , (29)
in which, we suppose the transition rate is
w
(
x
′
→ x
)
=
e
β
[
Ei(x)−Ei
(
x
′
)]
∑
y e
β[Ei(y)−Ei(x′)]
=
eβE
i(x)∑
y e
βEi(y)
.
The Master Equation here is actually N related equations, because Ei depends on H iR,
which is determined by other players’ state. From background of Statistical Mechanics,
6
we know, if it’s a single equation, or we say, Ei is independent on other players’ state,
the equilibrium state when dp
i(x,t)
dt
= 0 will be
pi (x,∞) =
eβE
i(x)∑
x
′ eβE
i(x′)
.
But, unfortunately, here all equations are related. So we make another assumption
that the time scale of a single Master Equation is much smaller than the time scale of
the related equations. In physics, this means that we let the single equation evolute to
equilibrium first, then we feedback the equilibrium state into all other equations and
so on. Under such assumption, we will get another N related equations from equ(29),
pi (x, t+ 1) =
eβE
i(x,t)∑
x
′ eβE
i(x′ ,t)
.
In density matrix notation,
ρi (t+ 1) =
eβH
i
R
(t)
Tri(eβH
i
R
(t))
, (30)
very similar with the Boltzman distribution for canonical ensemble in Statistical Me-
chanics. Now we have an evolutionary equation although we don’t know it can give
some information about the game solution or not. It’s not on the basis of first principle,
however, as in Statistical Mechanics, since we wish it will give reasonable game solution
as equilibrium state, we name it pseudo-dynamical equation and name the equilibrium
state if possible Pseudo-Dynamical Equilibrium (PDE).
In such evolution, first, we choose an initial state for every player, at every step,
start from player i, calculate H iR, get the new state of player i by equ(30), then feed it
into other players’ reduced payoff matrix to get their new states. Repeat such step till
some fixed pattern if it’s possible. The existence of such pattern is not proved, and the
specific order of choosing which player first may affect such pattern. So the whole thing
is still open, and should be investigated further. Even the equation itself is derived by
two assumptions, first the Master Equation (29) and second the time scale assumption.
The intuitive meaning of such iteration equation is that every player decides its own
response to all other players according to the possible payoff, but instead of choosing
the best one uses a distribution function, then other players repeat such iteration and
so on.
The privilege of our representation is that because we use payoff matrix (a (1, 1)-
tensor) and reduced payoff matrix to calculate the payoff value, when they are putted
onto exponential function, they will give a naturally defined density matrix of play-
ers’ states. Compared with the mapping of equ(25), iteration process equ(30) can be
approximately reexpressed as
ρi (t+ 1) =
ρi (t)
1 + Tri(eβH
i
R
(t))
+
eβH
i
R(t)
1 + Tri(eβH
i
R
(t))
, (31)
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because usually Tri(eβH
i(t))≫ 1. So the difference between the mapping equ(25) and
our iteration is that matrix eβH
i
R(t) is used to replace matrix ∆Ei. We wish such
replacement will not change the idea of NE so far that it still can give information
of game solution. On the other hand, besides the similarity with the mapping, the
iteration process here looks very reasonable and comparable with the real game process.
Everyone chooses initial state first, then decides the best response according to states
of other players, and then iterates such process.
However, whatever it looks like, the only test is whether it will give reasonable
game solution or not. A theoretical comparison between PDE and NE is ongoing in
our work plan, but here, as far as the well-known specific games we tried, it gives quite
good results[1]. And in some cases, when unstable NE exists, our iteration gives some
pattern such as a jumping between some NE states, in other cases, when stable NEs
exist, it end at one point of the NEs depending on initial state. It seems that even
the iteration process itself is meaningful. In such cases, stable NEs can be regarded as
the end results of the iteration process. It’s quite amazing, but still waiting for more
exploration.
6 Quantum Game and Quantum Nash Equilibrium
From the proof of equivalence, equ(12), we know that because payoff matrixH i has only
diagonal term, only diagonal term of ρS comes into the expression of payoff value. And
similarly, if ρS has only the diagonal term, only diagonal term of H i will be effective.
This property implies two things. The first, as we did for continuous strategy games, a
wave function can be used to replace distribution function. Second, if in some games, a
payoff function with non-zero off-diagonal elements and a non-zero off-diagonal density
matrix, are required, they will be totally new games. Effect of the first aspect will
be discussed in the last section (§7). In this section, we try to find some manipulative
examples of the new games.
On the other hand, let’s suppose players can make use of quantum operator as
strategy. We have a quantum object, every player applies a quantum operator on it
and then the payoff of every player is determined by the end state of quantum object.
In fact, this game use the same idea of classical game, but with the quantum object
and quantum strategies. As in [1], using Quantum Penny Flip Game[3] as example, the
quantum object is a spin, the quantum strategies are all unitary matrix acting on the
spin, and the payoff is determined by the end state of the spin. Compared with classical
games, in quantum game, base strategies still can be defined, even quite natural. State
space of the quantum object has Q base vectors {|µ〉}, so the quantum operator has
the form
Uˆ =
∑
µν
Uµν |µ〉 〈ν| . (32)
Therefor, {|µ〉 〈ν|} can be regarded as Q×Q base vectors of the operator space. And
because the operator space is still a Hilbert space, we even can define the inner product
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as (
Uˆ , Vˆ
)
= Tr
(
Uˆ †Vˆ
)
(33)
so that {|Φ〉 = |µ〉 〈ν|} will be a set of orthogonal unit base vectors. Now we can denote
the strategy state of player i by state vector or a density matrix in operator Hilbert
space,
ρi =
∑
Φ,Ψ ρ
i
ΦΨ |Φ〉 〈Ψ| or ρ
i = |U〉 〈U | =
∑
Φ,Ψ UΦU
∗
Ψ |Φ〉 〈Ψ| . (34)
In the direct product space of all single-player strategy spaces, state of the whole N -
player system is
ρS =
N∏
i=1
ρi, (35)
if the state of all players are independent, or in Game Theory language, non-cooperative.
According to Quantum Mechanics, the payoff value should be
Ei = Tr
(
ρSH i
)
. (36)
So a quantum game is defined as
Γq =
(
N∏
i=1
⊗Sqi ,
{
H i
})
. (37)
Some specific quantum games such as Quantum Penny Flip Game[3] and Quantum
Prisoner’s Dilemma[4] have been reexpressed and studied in the new representation in
[1] and [5]. Here we ‘theoretically’ define a manipulative general quantum game, and
prove that it can be described in our new representation. A real quantum game is
defined in quantum operator level, so all strategies are quantum operators acting on
a quantum object, whose initial state is denoted as ρq0 ∈ H
q. Here, because we use
density matrix, which can also be regarded as an operator, to represent state of the
quantum object, Hq denotes both the state space of the quantum object and operator
space on it. Every player choose strategy Uˆ i ∈ Hi, which is an operator from subspace
of Hq onto the subspace, then the jointed operator acting on the quantum object is
Uˆ = L
(
Uˆ1, · · · , UˆN
)
, (38)
a linear mapping of Uˆ i from direct product strategy space H =
∏N
i ⊗H
i to operator
space of quantum object Hq,
L
(
· · · , α · Uˆ i, · · ·
)
= α · L
(
· · · , Uˆ i, · · ·
)
, α ∈ C,∀i. (39)
Product and direct product are typical forms of such mapping[1, 5]. Then the end state
of the quantum object is
ρq = Uˆρq0Uˆ
†. (40)
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Payoff value of player i is determined by
Ei = Tr
(
P iρq
)
, (41)
in which P i is a matrix in Hq, named payoff scale matrix, which gives the rule or scale
to determine the payoff. In Quantum Penny Flip Game, it’s
P 1 = |U〉 〈U | − |D〉 〈D| = −P 2.
For player 1, this means to assign 1 to up state and −1 to down state. The form in
Quantum Prisoner’s Dilemma Game has also been given in [5]. So a Quantum Game
in operator level, the language of Quantum Mechanics, is
Γq,o =
(
H
q,
N∏
i=1
⊗Hi,L,
{
P i
})
. (42)
Now as we did in classical game, we need to prove Γq,o can be equivalently described
by Γq. Before the detailed proof, we want to point out the linear property of L, equ(39),
is a very important condition. Even in classical game, we can find the corresponding
implied condition. Starting from a pure strategy game, the only thing we know is the
elements of payoff tensor Gi, which can only give the payoff for pure strategies, but
we need to know the payoff value for mixture strategies. Equ(3) uses mathematical
expectation to calculate it. It seems quite natural, but is it really the only possible?
The nonlinear behavior might be possible. For example, consider the situation that a
girl and a boy work together. They have two optional jobs. When they use a little
time together, the interaction between them is weak, the efficiency is low; when they
spend more time together, they know each other better, so the efficiency is higher; when
they spend too much time together, they will find more shortcoming of each other, or
otherwise they will flirt with each other, anyway, the efficiency will be lower again.
This is a truly non-linear behavior. Our current Game Theory could never describe
this phenomenon. So this is the implied linear condition of classical game,
Ei
(
· · · , α · ρia + β · ρ
i
b, · · ·
)
= α·Ei
(
· · · , ρia, · · ·
)
+β·Ei
(
· · · , ρib, · · ·
)
,∀α, β ∈ [0, 1] . (43)
This will require
{
Gi
}
are linear mappings, (0, N)-tensors. Now in our quantum game,
this condition implies linear property of mapping L and equ(41), the trace operator.
And in the abstract form Γq, this condition is automatically fulfilled when
{
H i
}
are
(1, 1)-tensors. Now we prove the equivalence.
Theorem III Γq,o is equivalent with Γq. This is to say for all players with arbitrary
strategies, the two representations give the same payoff for every player.
Proof For player i’s operator space, choose a set of base vectors according to equ(33),
the inner product definition, and denote them as
{
|s〉i
}
and
{
sˆi
}
, which, for the quan-
tum object, are operators such as {|µ 〉〈 ν|}, but for the players, are some base strategies.
Suppose, player i choose strategy Uˆ i, which can be expanded as
Uˆ i =
∑
s
U is |s〉
i =
∑
s
U issˆ
i.
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Density matrix form of this player’s state is
ρi =
∑
φi,ψi
U iφ
(
U iψ
)∗
|φ〉i 〈ψ|i .
System state density matrix is
ρS =
N∏
i
∑
φi,ψi
U iφ
(
U iψ
)∗
|φ〉i 〈ψ|i .
Define every elements payoff matrix in this representation as
〈
φ1 · · ·φN
∣∣H i ∣∣ψ1 · · ·ψN〉 = H i
SS
′ = Tr
(
P iL
(
φˆ1, · · · , φˆN
)
ρ
q
0L
†
(
ψˆ1, · · · , ψˆN
))
.
(44)
Payoff from equ(41) is
Ei = Tr
(
P iL
(
· · · ,
∑
φj U
j
φφˆ
j, · · ·
)
ρ
q
0L
†
(
· · · ,
∑
ψj U
j
ψψˆ
j , · · ·
))
= Tr
(
P i
∑
φj U
1
φ · · ·U
N
φ L
(
· · · , φˆj , · · ·
)
ρ
q
0
∑
ψj
(
U1ψ
)∗
· · ·
(
UNψ
)∗
L†
(
· · · , ψˆj , · · ·
))
=
∑
φj U
1
φ · · ·U
N
φ
∑
ψj
(
U1ψ
)∗
· · ·
(
UNψ
)∗
Tr
(
P iL
(
· · · , φˆj , · · ·
)
ρ
q
0L
†
(
· · · , ψˆj , · · ·
))
=
∑
φj U
1
φ · · ·U
N
φ
∑
ψj
(
U1ψ
)∗
· · ·
(
UNψ
)∗ 〈
φ1 · · · φN
∣∣H i ∣∣ψ1 · · ·ψN〉
= Tr
(
ρSH i
)
.
So for all quantum pure strategy, those two forms give the same payoff. We require
P i is hermitian. It’s a payoff scale matrix, which assigns values to every state, there-
for, in a specific set of base vectors, P i should have only diagonal terms. So in this
representation, P iµν = 0 =
(
P iνµ
)∗
, then P i =
(
P i
)†
generally. Therefor, H i is also
hermitian. Further more, in density matrix form, not only pure quantum strategies,
but also quantum mixture strategies are allowed to be used by quantum players. And
still the payoff are given by equ(36). This means, not only unitary operator, but also
mixture of unitary operators, can be a strategy of quantum player. Whether such
strategy is applicable or not will depend on further application and realization of the
idea of quantum game.
Now classical game and quantum game have the same forms except non-zero off-
diagonal terms in quantum payoff matrix. Sometimes, quantum game has classical
sub-game, in which a set of special base vectors (strategies) can be found that the
corresponding sub-matrix H i,c of H i is diagonal. An example of this is Quantum
Penny Flip Game and Classical Penny Flip Game[1], in which N c, F c are classical
base vectors while the quantum base vectors include other two base strategies N q, F q.
In that situation, we say the quantum game has classical limit. So there are several
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different strategy spaces, classical pure strategy space, classical mixture strategy space,
quantum pure strategy space and quantum mixture strategy space. Even a larger
space can be took into our consideration, which destroys equ(35), the direct product
relation between system state and single-player state. We name it entangled strategy
space, which includes vectors in system space not only the direct-product states. And
we name the game with diagonal payoff matrix in classical mixture strategy space as
Classical Game (CG); the game with diagonal payoff matrix in quantum pure strategy
space as Quantized Classical Game (QCG), which are equivalent with CG; the game
with general payoff matrix in quantum pure strategy space as Pure-strategy Quantum
Game (PQG); the game with general payoff matrix in quantum mixture strategy space
as Quantum Game (QG); the game with general payoff matrix in entangled quantum
strategy space as Entangled Quantum Game (EQG), the game with diagonal payoff
matrix in entangled classical strategy space as Entangled Classical Game (ECG). So{
CG = QCG ⊆ ECG
PQG ⊆ QG ⊆ EQG,
Now our question is what kind of equilibrium states exist in which strategy space.
We know Nash Theorem is valid in classical mixture strategy space. Will a Nash-
like equilibrium state exist in quantum game, and in which strategy space? A General
Classical Nash Equilibrium (GCNE) and General Quantum Nash Equilibrium (GQNE)
is defined as
Ei
(
ρSeq
)
≥ Ei
(
Tri
(
ρSeq
)
· ρi
)
,∀ρi,∀i. (45)
When ρS =
∏N
i ρ
i, this definition will become equ(4), the traditional definition of NE,
but for quantum game, we name it Quantum Nash Equilibrium (QNE).
Proposition NE exists in CG, GCNE exists in ECG, QNE exists in QG and GQNE
exists in EQG.
Proof A general proof is still open. The first part is Nash Theorem. For the third
part, for a special class of quantum game, in which
[
H i,Hj
]
= 0,∀i, j, we can prove
the existence of QNE. First, find the common eigenvectors set of
{
H i
}
, and then in
this new representation, all payoff matrix are diagonal. So the quantum game looks
similar with classical game, but in another set of base vectors. Because NE exists in
the new classical game, QNE exists in the original quantum game. So for such games,
QNE exists. For the second and the fourth part, for another special class of quantum
game, in which all
{
H i
}
have a common eigenvector ρSM with maximum eigenvalue, so
that
Ei
(
ρSM
)
≥ Ei
(
ρS
)
,∀ρS ,∀i, (46)
ρSM will be GCNE or GQNE. Since it’s a vector in system space, it’s possible that it
is not a direct product of single player state. Let’s keep fingers crossed for a general
proof in the near future.
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7 Conclusion and discussion
We have seen that our Quantum Game and Entangled Quantum Game are truly inde-
pendent thing, which is impossible to be put into the old framework of Gi in Γc. In
fact, elements of Gi are only the diagonal part of H i. This is partially an answer to
the second question in [2], but still not a confirmative answer. The applicability value
of this Quantum Game can only been shown through a real quantum game, in which
players make use of quantum operators acting on a quantum object. However, most
examples we have now are toy games, not from real experiments in quantum world. In
the future, we will try to propose one real game from the world of quantum computation
or quantum communication, etc.
Now, we turn to discuss the first question in [2], if our new approach is helpful to
solve the Classical Game. Since Gi is enough for classical game, theoretically, this new
approach brings nothing new into Classical Game. So how about the technical level?
Will the new approach be helpful to calculation of NE in Classical Game? We have
shown in section §3, a wave vector and its density matrix ρi =
∑
µν
(
φiν
)∗
φiµ |µ〉 〈ν| can
equivalently replace ~pi = (· · · , piµ, · · ·)
T . In fact, the former provides much redundant
information through the off-diagonal terms, as we know, in classical game, only the
diagonal terms piµ =
(
φiµ
)∗
φiµ effect the payoff. From theoretical viewpoint, it’s waste
of time, however, from calculation viewpoint, this means we can use quantum state
to calculate problems in Classical Game. Because a single quantum state includes as
much as variables in a very complex combination classical state, this makes it possible to
improve calculation of NE in Classical Game. Further more, if an evolution equation
of wave vector, instead of our pseudo-dynamical equation of density matrix, can be
found, next time, when we need to calculate classical NE, the only thing need to do is
to choose an arbitrary initial state of a quantum system and let it evolute according to
the equation, and then, the end state will be the answer. As in Quantum Mechanics,
Schro¨dinger Equation of wave vector is equivalent with Liouville Equation of density
matrix, all linear equation of density matrix can be transferred into linear equation of
wave vector. Although our current pseudo-dynamical equation are not linear, it is not
impossible to find another better linear equation to describe the evolution process.
Besides the technical level of NE calculation, the new approach opens an exited
way to deal with Evolutionary Game and Cooperative Game . From the application
experience in [1], not only the end state, but also the pseudo-dynamical process seems
meaningful in Game Theory. And in the new representation, the system state of non-
cooperative players is a direct product density matrix, while a general density matrix
in system state space includes some correlation between players, can be naturally used
to discuss cooperative game. Evolutionary Game and Cooperative Game are another
two important topics. In traditional Game Theory, the framework of evolutionary
game is far from elegant. It will be a great progress if this new representation can be
easily applied onto those two aspects. For example, let’s suppose a GCNE/GQNE, or
specially the ρM in equ(46) has been found for a game. It’s not a direct-product state,
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so that
ρS 6=
N∏
i
Tr−i
(
ρS
)
. (47)
But it’s still probable in some sectors of players N =
⋃s
j=1N
j , in which N is the set
of players and N j is a subset of N , that
ρS =
s∏
j
ρj , (48)
although when
∣∣N j∣∣ > 1, ρj 6= ∏|Nj|i Tr−i (ρj). So the subsets {N j} can be regarded
as player groups. Therefor, if such groups can be naturally derived from ECG and
EQG, our new representation will be a way being applicable to Cooperative Game[6].
For the applicability value of our quantum game, another factor has to be took into
consideration. Not all vectors in quantum pure strategy space are unitary operators.
If we require all physical operators are unitary, only part of the space can give real
applicable strategies, and even worse, they might not be a subspace. This will exclude
some equilibrium solutions, even when QNE or GQNE does exist in the whole space
of quantum strategy space or entangled quantum strategy space. In that situation, it’s
not a confirmative result even we prove the existence of NE. Fortunately, in a 2 × 2
quantum operators space, the unitary operators still expand a subspace. A general
2× 2 quantum operator is
Uˆ = ξ · Iˆ + x · σˆx + y · σˆy + z · σˆz, ξ, x, y, z ∈ C, (49)
while a unitary 2× 2 quantum operator is
Uˆ = ξ · Iˆ + ix · σˆx + iy · σˆy + iz · σˆz, ξ, x, y, z ∈ R. (50)
So we can still ask the question that if QNE and GQNE exist in the subspace. But
we only have such good conclusion for 2 × 2 quantum operator space, we don’t know
it’s a general result or not. However, even if it’s not a general conclusion so that we
have to discuss equilibrium state in the whole space including non-unitary operators,
maybe someday, we can make use of non-unitary operators as strategy so it’s even
better to consider questions in the whole space. All such open problems depend on the
application and realization of real quantum games.
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